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A B S T R A C T
Cash transfers have received increased scholarly and policy attention, as a means of reducing poverty in the
global South. While cash transfers are primarily intended to prevent impoverishment and deprivation, several
studies suggest they can have 'productive' impacts, contributing to building sustainable livelihoods. However,
pilot projects of unconditional cash transfers have often been too brief or too recent to determine how small, but
regular, transfers can improve rural livelihoods over time.
This paper explores potential long-term productive effects of cash transfers on rural household’s livelihoods.
This is done through revisiting, after 14 years, all (273) households in two South African villages included in an
extensive livelihood and asset survey in 2002. That survey predated the phasing in of the Child Support Grant
(CSG), targeted at impoverished children. When re-surveyed in 2016, some households had cumulatively re-
ceived significant, while others little or no CSG income. Multivariate regression analysis shows how households
that received more CGS income were more likely to invest in productive assets (e.g. small ploughs), and engage
in poultry, staple crop and vegetable production. We also found a statistically significant correlation between
CSG incomes and growing a larger variety of crops, in an environment generally marked by deagrarianization.
However, correlations between receiving more CSG and employment or engagement in informal small-scale
trade were not significant. We use data from interviews and observations to explain these processes further.
Compared with the paucity of outcomes from other concurrent and costly development interventions in the
focal villages, cash transfers have improved livelihoods and living conditions significantly. However, the
structural and contextual factors that cause and reproduce poverty remain unaltered, limiting the effects of
comparatively small cash transfers. While we show that the cash transfers generate productive livelihood-en-
hancing effects, they remain insufficient to lift most households out of poverty without further structural changes
and developmental interventions.
1. Introduction
Most of the world’s poorest people live in rural areas and struggle to
sustain their livelihoods, especially in the light of challenges such as
climate change, declining prices for cash crops, decreased access to land
and declining employment opportunities. Various development efforts,
ranging from agricultural development interventions and microfinance
initiatives to the promotion of private investments have often failed to
foster sustainable livelihoods in impoverished rural areas (Bateman,
2010; Hajdu, 2006; Hajdu, Jacobson, Salomonsson, & Friman, 2012;
Jacobson, 2013).
Over the past decade, cash transfers have received increased at-
tention as a policy response to poverty (Barrientos, 2013; de Haan,
2014; Hulme, Hanlon, & Barrientos, 2012). In sub-Saharan Africa, they
have coalesced around unconditional cash transfer schemes (Davis et al.,
2016). Research suggests they effectively address poverty, through
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improving consumption, nutrition, and school enrolment (Ballard,
2013; Ellis, Devereux, & White, 2009; Farrington & Slater, 2006). De-
scribing a decade of growing evidence of various, mostly successful,
experiments to “Just Give Money to the Poor”, Hulme and others
(2012) argue cash transfers are effective and affordable policy inter-
ventions to reduce poverty. Policy attention has since increased and
numerous donors and domestically funded unconditional cash transfer
projects are evident across Africa (e.g. Davis et al., 2016; de Haan,
2014).
Evaluating cash transfer programs in eight African countries, the
Transfer Project finds strong evidence for both protective effects,
smoothing consumption and mitigating risks for the poorest house-
holds, but also productive effects, facilitating poor households in im-
proving their long-term living standards (Davis et al., 2016; Handa
et al., 2018). From the earliest debate regarding the efficacy or ‘de-
pendency’ effects of cash transfers1, discourse increasingly centers on
their role in poverty reduction, and, more recently, productive effects
on livelihoods (Farrington & Slater, 2006, Davis et al., 2016; Fisher
et al., 2017).
Although cash transfer programs were seldom intended to have any
more than protective effects, some studies have explored their pro-
ductive effects (Daidone, Davis, Handa, & Winters, 2019). Yet several
authors have cautioned against undue ‘hype’ where cash transfers are
viewed as a ‘magic bullet’ for development; predicated on the simplistic
assumption that structural poverty can be addressed through diminu-
tive cash transfers, somehow leveraged into livelihood activities, and
eventual ‘graduation’ from the programmes (Adesina, 2011; Daidone,
Pellerano, Handa, & Davis, 2015; Khan, 2013). Even though cash
transfers are effective interventions in the protective sense, the extent to
which they enable long-term productive activities, and their effects on
recipients’ livelihoods remains unclear.
This study accordingly examines the long-term productive effects on
impoverished livelihoods of a small cash transfer, South Africa’s Child
Support Grant. It builds on a study where all 273 households in two
rural villages were surveyed in 2002, a survey repeated in 2016.
Although initiated in 1998 the Child Support Grant (CSG) was not
rolled out in the villages until 2002. Hence, the 2002 data is a baseline,
prior to the effects of the CSG. In 2016, the villages were re-surveyed,
with some households having collected up to 110 years’ worth of CSG
payments (for multiple beneficiary children). Other households had
received no or only a few years’ worth of grants, typically because their
children aged in advance of the incrementally extended age eligibility
threshold. If it is true that cash transfers have long-term positive im-
pacts beyond immediate consumption, then the households that re-
ceived multiple years of grant income should be better off relative to
households with no or little history of CSG receipt.
One difficulty studying the long-term effects of cash transfers is that
interventions such as the CSG, were generally not intended to generate
productive effects, and were thus not set up so these could readily be
measured. Moreover many ‘productive’ activities are often contextually
dependent, varied, and unfold over time - making them difficult to
capture analytically. The present study examines the long-term effects
of CSG receipt by combining quantitative panel data and regression
analysis with detailed, long-term ethnographic knowledge of the focal
context and qualitative in-depth interviews. In this article, the focus is
on the tangible, material effects of the transfers on assets and engage-
ment in livelihood activities. Another article examines qualitative data
from the same research project to explore the social and relational
effects of transfers (Granlund & Hochfeld, 2020)..
Attributing changes in livelihoods to the effects of grant receipt over
time is challenging and requires deeper insight in livelihoods and
practices than what evaluations of welfare grant expenditure can pro-
duce (Davis, Gaarder, Handa, & Yablonski, 2012). Effects that are dif-
ficult to capture may include impacts of long-term investments in
human capital (e.g. education, health care) or investment in assets that
free up labour time and thus enable other productive activities. Even
when grant income is spent on food it can have long-term productive
effects – e.g. through preventing households from eating seeds intended
for future planting - a documented phenomenon in the region (c.f.
(Fischer & Hajdu, 2015). Attribution is challenging also since various
factors unrelated to grant receipt potentially influence households over
time, including (shifting) household composition and the effects of
(often erratic) temporary employment. Both can be significant in rela-
tion to the relatively low value of the grant. However, there are no
reasons to think that these causes of error are systematic and would
skew results significantly in either direction.
This study was located in South Africa, a context marked by simi-
larities but also key differences with the rest of the continent. South
Africa is unusual in the long historical precedent for its welfare system.
Rooted in 1920′s state welfare for ‘whites’ (of European descent), which
was slowly expanded to ‘natives’ from the mid twentieth century on-
wards. Research has historically examined non-contributory social
pensions, showing their impacts on improving the livelihoods of pen-
sioner’s households (Devereux, 2007). However, the bulk of the post-
apartheid growth in welfare transfers was in the introduction and ex-
pansion of the Child Support Grant, received by approximately 62% of
all children in South Africa2. Unusually in global terms, the CSG can be
received by even the non-biological caregivers of beneficiary children,
and is effectively unconditional (as existing conditions are broad and
little enforced).
Social welfare transfers are part of highly unequal South Africa’s
larger ‘distributional regime’ (Seekings & Nattrass, 2005). The combi-
nation of an efficient and progressive taxation system with compara-
tively large numbers of beneficiaries (over 30% of the population),
make cash transfers an important redistributive mechanism. Yet ex-
treme poverty and inequality, largely contoured by South Africa's ra-
cialized past, endure. The concentrated core industrial and service
economy create few opportunities for unskilled rural dwellers. The
same dynamic limits the space for small or emergent enterprises, re-
sulting in South Africa’s comparatively low levels of informal sector
employment (Devey, Skinner, & Valodia, 2005). The legacy of colonial
and apartheid era dispossession, together with the capital-intensive
growth trajectory of the post-apartheid economy, therefore see rural
residents subject to ‘jobless de-agrarianisation’ (du Toit & Neves, 2014),
where declining land and agrarian livelihoods are unmatched by op-
portunities in secure employment or urban residency.
The remainder of the article reviews the literature on the effects of
cash transfers in relation to their impact on livelihoods, following
which, the research methods, including the survey, interviews and
ethnographic work, are explicated. This is followed by a discussion of
the focal villages, including data on livelihood changes and informant
accounts of grant use. After this background, the factors for determining
long-term effects of cash transfers identified and the regression analysis
conducted are discussed. Regression analysis results are presented and
interpreted in analytic dialogue with ethnographic and interview data.
The paper concludes with reflection on the potential long-term effects
on livelihoods of small cash transfers.
1 In popular debate, the fear of grants causing dependency is still present, and
CSG is also often seen as causing elevated teenage fertility levels. Yet analysis
shows that fertility levels are comparable to what they would be in the absence
of the CSG (Makiwane, 2010; Rosenberg et al., 2015) and that cash transfer
programs do not have negative effects on labour supply (Daidone et al., 2019;
Davis et al., 2016).
2 We get this number by dividing the 12 081 375 CSG recipients in March
2018 (www.sassa.org.za) with the latest number of total children in South
Africa, 19 579 000 in 2017 (childrencount.uct.ac.za), which gives us 61,7%.
Most of the remaining children are likely to be non-eligible based on the means
testing.
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2. Literature review: The productive effects of cash transfers
Early debates about unconditional cash transfers focused on their
effectiveness and concerns pertaining to unintended or undesirable side
effects (Farrington & Slater, 2006). Since then, the welfare effects of
elevated consumption, improved health, nutrition and other proximate
effects have been well documented (e.g. Hulme et al., 2012). Con-
temporary debates instead focus on the potential productive effects and
transformative potential of cash transfers, yet few studies so far em-
pirically examine productive effects (Daidone et al., 2019).
Cash transfer policy experiments, such as a universal income grant
pilot project in Namibia, showed significant and broad impacts, in-
cluding on productive factors such as employment and incomes
(Haarmann, Haarmann, Jauch, Shindondola-Mote, Nattrass, van
Niekerk, & Samson, 2009). Hulme et al. (2012) note that cash transfers
improved health, nutrition and education, thereby replacing the vicious
cycle of intergenerational poverty with a virtuous development cycle.
South Africa’s Child Support Grant has been studied (Hochfeld &
Plagerson, 2017) but evaluations mainly focused on improvements in
child wellbeing ((DSD, SASSA, & UNICEF, 2012) rather than productive
effects on household level. Productive is here defined as investments in
assets that save labour time, or enhance productivity (e.g. in agri-
cultural activities) or facilitate engagement with economic opportu-
nities including informal enterprise.
Influential evidence of productive effects of cash transfer in Africa
has emanated from the Transfer Project (Davis et al., 2016; Handa
et al., 2018), a collaboration with the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion (FAO) and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). In Malawi,
the Social Cash Transfer pilot program found a significant increase in
ownership of agricultural implements (e.g. hoes, sickles and axes) and
of chickens. Informal seasonal agricultural labour declined, as people
spent more time farming their own plots. The evaluation demonstrated
that cash transfers help farming households overcome credit and li-
quidity constraints (Boone, Covarrubias, Davis, and Winters (2013).
Zambia’s Child Grant Program (CGP) (targeting the poorest households,
in the poorest districts) showed similarly significant impacts on agri-
cultural activities, e.g. investments in agricultural implements and in-
puts, livestock and poultry. Other benefits included an increase in la-
trines, and improvements in daily living (e.g. using candles and torches
for illumination instead of open fires) (Handa, Seidenfeld, Davis,
Tembo, & Team, 2016; Handa et al., 2018; Daidone et al., 2019).
The Transfers Project’s impact evaluations of cash transfer programs
in Kenya, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Lesotho and Ghana showed more mixed
results for productive effects. Differences in impacts across countries
appeared related to the value and predictability of the transfer, the
length of the evaluation period, and quality of programme commu-
nication with beneficiaries. Zambia’s comparatively generous and reg-
ular transfers were associated with the strongest and most consistent
effects, enhancing poor households’ probability of engaging in pro-
ductive activities (Daidone et al., 2019). With regards to effects on la-
bour supply or work effort, the Transfer project found no overall re-
duction in this due to transfers, instead money was used for improving
household income-generating activities (Daidone et al., 2019).
The above studies used similar quantitative methodologies, with
either randomised control trials or propensity score matching, and strict
impact evaluations with baseline and endpoint surveys. However, in-
depth understandings of local livelihood activities and contexts is
needed in order to fully grasp long-term productive effects, but little
such research has been undertaken (Davis et al., 2012). There remains a
dearth of studies on long-term productive effects of cash transfers in
Africa, especially studies that combine qualitative and quantitative
enquiry.
As already suggested, there has been criticism of the cash transfer
‘hype’– and its tendency to displace responsibility for poverty reduction
and improving livelihoods onto the poor themselves, as well as ex-
pecting outsized impacts from small sums of money, while neglecting to
address the wider structural factors underpinning poverty (e.g. Adesina,
2011; Ferguson, 2007; Sandberg, 2012). The focus on “the poor”, a
contested categorization in itself, has similarly been problematized
(Adesina, 2011; Knox-Vydmanov, 2014). Even firm proponents of cash
transfers acknowledge they are not a panacea for poverty, but should be
a part of an overall development strategy (Standing & Samson, 2003).
Thus, comprehensive evidence of the extent and manner in which cash
transfers help strengthen recipient livelihoods in the long term is
needed.
3. Data collection
This paper draws on data collected in 2002 by Hajdu (Hajdu, 2006)
and more recently by Granlund in 2016. The 2016 data collection was
comparable to 2002, with both villages surveyed in their entirety using
a common survey questionnaire, with only a few minor amendments.
The survey strategy was replicated, and drew on locally recruited and
extensively trained research assistants, alongside a researcher present
in all interviews. The survey questionnaire included questions on
household size, formal and informal jobs, remittances, social grants, use
of natural resources, energy sources, assets, livestock, agricultural ac-
tivities, health, and perceptions of livelihood security. In 2016 addi-
tional questions included on research participants used of their social
grant money. The research assistants were local villagers (some worked
both in 2002 and 2016), who assisted in first developing and piloting
the questionnaire before conducting the survey during two weeks in
each village, together with Hajdu and Granlund respectively.
In addition to the survey, each researcher lived in the villages for
several months, conducting participatory observations and in-depth
interviews about livelihoods and social grants. Hajdu undertook nine
visits over 17 years (2001–2018) remaining in contact with key in-
formants via phone and social media between visits. The survey was
thus rooted in deep knowledge of the local context and livelihoods, as
was the subsequent interpretation of results.
Finally, the data and our preliminary conclusions were cross-
checked with the research assistants as well as the communities during
a dissemination visit in 2018. A final round of complementary inter-
views was then undertaken, to refine the nascent analysis.
4. Changes in village livelihoods (2002–2016)
In this section, the two case study villages are presented, together
with background data on the changes during the period of study, and
accounts of recipients grant use.
The focal case study villages, Cutwini and Manteku, are located is
the north-eastern part of the South Africa’s Eastern Cape Province, in
the communal areas of the former Transkei ‘homeland’. The communal
areas are some of poorest regions in rural South Africa due to the legacy
of colonialism and apartheid, with a long history of underdevelopment,
poor quality public services (e.g. health and education) and infra-
structure (Shackleton & Luckert, 2015). In 2002, there were no water
taps or electricity, with rough unpaved roads to both villages. Im-
provements by 2016 included electricity (installed in 2011–2013) and
improvements to the (still unpaved) roads, but water remained col-
lected from springs or distant communal tanks.
Although both villages are situated close to the coast, there are
important differences between them. Cutwini is in a relatively isolated,
area with poor infrastructure but has extensive grazing and agricultural
lands. The smaller village of Manteku is located closer to the Indian
Ocean enjoying better access to fishing (compared to Cutwini), but
limited agricultural lands. Hilly topography, deep river valleys and a
dense indigenous forest isolate Manteku from villages further inland,
where most Manteku children attend school.
Table 1 shows key characteristics of the villages and changes be-
tween 2002 and 2016. While population numbers decreased in Cutwini
and increased slightly in Manteku, both villages comprise of larger
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number of households in 2016 compared to 2002. Cutwini households
have become smaller, typically due to young adults moving out of their
natal households earlier. Only 2–4% of households moved in from
outside the villages between 2002 and 2016. The other new households
are attributable to intra-village movements.
Between 2002 and 2016, the quality of village housing improved
and villagers report fewer concerns about basic survival such as having
sufficient food. At the same time, several livelihoods-related metrics
deteriorated. Livelihood changes in the villages between 2002 and 2016
are the focus of another article (Hajdu, Neves, & Granlund, 2020), but
summarised briefly here. Since 2002, employment opportunities have
declined and become less attractive (see Table 1). Even in 2002 villa-
gers expressed unhappiness with the low and erratic wages at the
nearby homeland-era tea plantation, which was employing many Cut-
wini residents. By 2016 the tea plantation, long wracked by misman-
agement and instability (Kepe, 2005), saw workers abandoning their
jobs after being unpaid for several months (though the situation had
improved again in 2018). The few local job opportunities in Manteku,
at the local Nature Conservation offices and casual work for private
cottage owners also disappeared. Hence, a higher percentage of
working aged adults were unemployed in 2016 than in 2002, despite
public employment programmes having provided temporary (low
paying) jobs in Cutwini. Accordingly, the income gap grew in the vil-
lages, and clear differences emerged between, on one hand, the few
villages with better jobs (especially in the public sector) and, the un-
employed or precariously (temporarily, informally) employed, on the
other. Lack of employment was worse in Manteku where labour-market
derived income (including from informal employment) shrunk by over
40% (adjusted for inflation) in the 14 years that elapsed. The resulting
lack of money in the village is likely influencing the number of people
engaged in local informal enterprises, and engagement in informal self-
employment had doubled in Cutwini, it had conversely declined in
Manteku between 2002 and 2016. Remittances from migrants had be-
come comparatively more important, especially in Manteku.
Natural environment-based livelihood activities included the use of
marine resources (fishing, collecting crayfish and mussels), agricultural
production through cultivation of gardens and fields, as well as the
keeping of livestock, pigs and fowl. In 2002, most households grew less
than 50% of their own vegetable needs, and field agriculture had long
been waning. By 2016, vegetable production for domestic use was even
less significant and field cultivation largely abandoned . Livestock
production however, remained at similar levels, even increasing in
Manteku where many began keeping goats by 2016. Marine resource
use, though undertaken by a similar number of households, became
more important to overall livelihoods in 2016. This was largely due to
improved marketing opportunities for crayfish (an external buyer with
a truck visiting Cutwini during crayfish season), and improved storage
following the introduction of electricity which enabled refrigeration
and reduced transaction costs as Manteku residents could accumulate
several days’ worth of fish caught and then travel to resell it in the
closest town (Lusikisiki).
Table 1 shows social grant data in the villages in 2002 and 2016. As
expected, there is a large increase in number of households receiving
‘any’ social grant, from approximate 30% to over 85% in both villages.
Most notable is the increase in Child Support Grant (CSG), rolled out in
the area during 2002 and thus still missing in the 2002 survey. Since
2002 South Africa has seen increased uptake of the Old Age Pension
and Disability Grant, for working age adults with a temporary or per-
manent disability. These are respectively the grants with second and
third largest number of beneficiaries, after the CSG. A small number of
households have also started receiving two other grants, The Foster
Child Grant and the Care Dependency Grant3.
Overall, the villagers were divided on the question as to whether life
had become better or worse over the past 14 years. While 53% and 56%
(in Cutwini and Manteku respectively) described life as better, 36/35%
perceived it to have become worse - partially reflecting the uneven
developments in the village over the years, especially declining em-
ployment. The data suggest that if it had not been for social grants, the
villagers would actually be worse off in 2016 due to declining em-
ployment and other income-generating opportunities. Social differ-
entiation and intra-village inequality had increased, though also partly
mitigated by social grants.
Important to note is that the two villages have been the focus of at
least six different development interventions since 2002. These pro-
grams have generally failed to produce the anticipated results and often
engendered disappointment and disillusionment amongst villages.
Between 2002 and 2016, Cutwini received three successive agricultural
development projects, each of which failed within 24 months (Hajdu,
Jacobson, Salomonsson, & Friman, 2012). Manteku was targeted by a
microfinance project that ultimately funded no local villagers, and an
ambitious (plant) nursery project that never generated income and
collapsed with the cessation of the funding (Hajdu, 2006). In the early
2000s the villages were sites in a large EU-funded community tourism
development project that promised many, ultimately unrealized, jobs
(Ntshona & Lahiff, 2003; Hajdu, 2006). All these failed projects in-
creased local frustration and suspicion. Several of these initiatives were
multi-million rand interventions suggesting no lack of ambition or
funding from government, NGOs and donor funders to effect develop-
ment and improve livelihoods. The developmental impacts of social
grants can be instructively contrasted with the costly, failed projects.
In response to a survey question on what grant income (expansively,
not just CSG) was spent, informants proffered a range of answers. These
can categorized into broad categories, such as food, education (espe-
cially fees, uniforms, food, transport and boarding for secondary school
children), agricultural production (including seeds, fertilizer,
Table 1
Basic data on households and grants Cutwini and Manteku in 2002 and 2016.
Total numbers and percentage of total (for that village and year) in brackets.
Cutwini Manteku
Household characteristics 2002 2016 2002 2016
Total number of households 146 174 87 99
Total population 944 918 588 608
















































Breakdown of social grants received




















Foster Child Grant 0 15 (9%) 0 4
(4%)




3 The CSG is the largest grant in terms of recipients, with 12.3 million re-
cipients nationally in 2018, followed by Older Person's Grant (i.e. pension, 3,3
million recipients) and Disability Grant (1 million recipients) – see Fact Sheet
No 2, 2018, www.sassa.gov.za/index.php/knowledge-centre/statistical-
reports).
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pesticides, tools, ploughing services and buying animals). Fig. 1 shows
the percentage of households that spend grant money on these items,
out of all households receiving any grants over the past 14 years (viz.
84–88% of the households in Cutwini/Manteku). Note that multiple
responses to the question were permitted.
Fig. 1 shows that grant money is most commonly used to purchase
food. The households not spending grant income on food typically have
other employment-derived incomes. In several instances, female re-
cipients relied on husband/male partner income for food while di-
recting CSG income towards children’s’ secondary schooling (especially
if the male partner was not the father of the child). Many used the
grants directly for productive purposes, including purchasing produc-
tive assets and making agricultural investments (e.g. livestock, seeds
and other inputs). Local spending potentially also stimulates the village
economy. Insurance, whether it is a local burial society or commercial
funeral cover, cushions households against unexpected shocks, while
rotating savings associations enable the purchase of higher-cost pro-
ductive assets such as rain water tanks (as shown below). About13-19%
of households stated that they used the CSG income to investment in
new livelihood activities, such as starting an informal enterprise or for
job searching outside the village (although the regression analysis
below does not show a correlation between having employment and
access to the CSG, discussed later). The sections that follow discuss
which expenditure can be deemed ‘productive’, and investigate how
households that received cumulatively more CSG income over the
years, have invested in assets and activities.
4.1. Data analysis
Two challenges need to be considered when seeking to under-
standing the relationship between CSG receipt and livelihoods, namely
of imputation and attribution. Firstly, determining or imputing how
much CSG each household received between 2002 and 2016 is a
challenge. For instance, CSG recipients may (or may not) take grants
with them as they move in or out of households. Grant recipients (al-
most invariably mothers or female kin) may not be co-resident with
beneficiary children, and difficulties applying for the CSG could have
led to otherwise eligible children not having received it. However, in
the calculations below it is assumed that the household members en-
umerated in 2016 have been consistently resident, and that each child
has received all the CSG income to which they were entitled. While
these ‘best-case’ assumptions may be a source of error, however CSG
take up rates are high, and there is no reason to believe that such error
is systematic.
Secondly, attributions of changes in household livelihoods is diffi-
cult, as they are mediated by a multitude of factors, such as for instance,
a household member securing employment (and income), unrelated to
grant receipt. Although the regression analysis controlled for other in-
comes reported in 2016, households may have received other incomes
Fig. 1. Uses of grant money, in percent, of all households receiving grants. Assets include clothes, pots and pans as well as larger assets such as water tank, fridge and
TV. Services include health care, builders, assistance in the home or hired agricultural labor. Ceremonial expenses are mainly funerals. Insurance and savings are
local community savings/insurance groups and formal funeral insurance.a Transportation is needed to buy bulk food in town. New livelihoods indicate expenditure
aimed at generating further income e.g. job searching or starting up an informal enterprise.
a Not directly related to the grant issue but nevertheless interesting in this
graph is the difference between the villages in handling of funerals, where in
Cutwini most households state that they have paid for funerals out of grant
money but relatively few have funeral insurance, whereas in Manteku most
families are paying for insurance and therefore not ending up spending grant
money on funerals, which are instead covered by the insurance.
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prior to 2016, effectively invisible to the survey. As the CSG is a small
sum, its effects are easily dwarfed if a household has had a member
with a reasonable job for a few years, relative to a consistently jobless
household. However, this source of error is not systematic across
households with low and higher levels of employment income. Hence
there is limited reason to believe that grant-recipient households de-
rived significant employment income (which systematically terminated
before 2016) than non– (or low) CSG receiving households.
4.2. CSG Receipt Years (CSGRY): A metric for calculations
Instead of using an indicator based on CSG income received at a
static point in 2016, a metric of comparison that reflects how much CSG
income households received since 2002, was required. The measure
constructed is Child Support Grant Receipt Years (CSGRY) and com-
prises the hypothetical maximum number of years any given household
would have received CSG income, if they had applied for, promptly and
continuously received the CSG at the point of grant eligibility. Though
the initial CSG registration process was slow in 2002, the vast majority
of households were registered within two years, and many received
retroactive payment. The isolated accounts of eligible children or older
persons not receiving the grant, typically due to bureaucratic issues
such as lacking birth certificate or losing ID documents, were generally
resolved over time. By 2016, amidst high take-up rates nationally, it
was impossible to find village households with eligible children who
were not receiving the CSG. The CSGRY metric thus represents the
arithmetic maximum of CSG income/s a household would have re-
ceived over the preceding 14 years4, but we have no reason to believe
the actual figure would be noticeably lower. This CSGRY metric varies
for different households depending on the number of children they have
had, but also depending on age of children as the upper age eligibility
threshold for the CSG was raised over the years. Until 2003 only chil-
dren up to 6 years old were eligible, after which it was extended to
children up to 8 years old. The threshold was then raised to 10 years
(2004), 13 years (2005), 15 years (2009) 16 years (2010) and finally to
18 years of age in 2012 (Seekings & Nattrass, 2015). The cumulative
sums for each household, based on age of each child in the household at
the time of the 2016 survey, was calculated. The computation assumed
that each child received the CSG from the year of eligibility, except
those with less than a year of eligibility in 2002, who were generally
excluded by officials, in the initially-slow grant registration process.
The distribution of CSGRY in households is shown in Fig. 2 – while 45
out of the 273 households did not receive any CSG, the distribution
among the rest was between 1 and 110 CSGRY, with the average being
27.6 years’ worth of CSG receipt.
4.3. Indicators for assessing developmental effects on livelihoods
The assets and livelihood activities selected for assessing the effects
of CSG receipt need to give an indication of how the household is faring
in livelihood terms. In this section the indicators for developmental
effects on livelihoods and the rationale for their selection are discussed.
4.3.1. Acquisition of significant productive assets
The correlation between CSGRY and the productive assets such as
rainwater tanks, fridges, stoves, cellphones, vehicles and ploughs were
tracked. Productive is defined in terms of assets that save labour time,
increase productivity or contribute to more efficient use of resources.
For example, water tanks, stoves and fridges save (particularly female)
labour time, fridges save transportation costs and ploughs increase
productivity. Cellphones enable communication and access to im-
portant information and reduce transaction costs (e.g. job searching and
enterprise opportunities).
4.3.2. Investments in pigs and poultry production
Fowls, including chicken, geese and ducks, are animals that women
usually control. While it is unlikely that women would have invested
CSG income into large livestock (especially cattle), they might have
diversified their livelihoods and food consumption through investing in
chicken or pigs. The analysis examined correlations between CSGRY
and poultry and pig ownership.
4.3.3. Investments in horticultural production for household consumption or
sale
Many survey respondents indicated they spent social grant income
on seeds, fertilizer and other inputs for cultivation (See Fig. 1 above).
Previous studies show households, which can afford to do so, prioritize
growing vegetables in their kitchen gardens (Fischer & Hajdu, 2015).
However, people may stop growing crops if they have the option of
buying food, especially if gardens yield little, are poorly fenced or
otherwise deficient (Hajdu et al., 2020). For some, growing a variety of
crops is an important way of diversifying income through selling to
others. These producers typically grow high-value vegetables, instead
(or in addition to) the three most commonly cultivated crops of maize,
beans and pumpkins. The study investigated both the likelihood of
crops cultivation correlated to CSGRY, but also the tendency to grow a
wider variety of crops, beyond the common three, such as cabbage,
spinach, taro, potatoes and tomatoes.
4.3.4. Holding a stable job
Having access to stable waged employment (i.e. not causal, informal
or public employment scheme work) is also, of course, a sign of a re-
silient livelihood situation. Stable employment typically consisted of
formal sector, waged employment, including a small number of people
employed in the public sector, e.g. teachers or nature conservation
guards. While CSG income is unlikely to enable recipient household
members to secure such jobs, theoretically the CSG could be invested in
better education in order to secure better jobs over time, or as shown by
Posel et al. (2006), directed to search for employment more actively. A
study by Samson et al. (2004) found that living in a household receiving
social grants is correlated with a higher success rate in finding em-
ployment. Hence, the correlation between CSGRY and a household
member holding a stable job was investigated.
4.3.5. Running an informal enterprise
Engagement in small-scale vending or retail or local income-gen-
erating activities such as driving a rural taxi is a useful complementary
activity that some villagers use as a major livelihood strategy. Many
CSG recipients explained that they wanted to invest in such activities.
However if CSG is the only resource available they start on a small
scale, e.g. buying sweets/cigarettes for resale in the village in order to
accumulate capital. The difficulties of undertaking such enterprises are
discussed below, and the correlation between CSGRY and engaging in
informal economic activity are investigate. These are dubbed ‘petty
trade’ in what follows but could also include non-tradeable and service
sector activities (e.g. housebuilding).
4.4. Regression analysis
To investigate the long-term productive effects of child support
grant (CSG) receipt on households’ livelihoods a regression analysis was
undertaken on the 2016 survey data. Variations in the eligibility of
child support grant between the periods 2002 and 2016 were computed
to create the CSGRY metric. Given that a household would be eligible
for a CSG if it has a child within the established age range, the CSG is
4 Note that we thus assume that every year of CSG is worth the same to a
household, even though the sum has been successively raised from R120 per
child in 2002 to R380 per in 2016. The raising of the sum has not followed
inflation exactly and therefore in reality the money was worth slightly more
some years than others.
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treated as an exogenous factor to the household’s decision in the model
(as the household has no control over a child’s age). The regression
analysis is specified as:
= + + + +XLivelihood CSGRYij ij j ij0 1
where Livelihoodij represents household livelihood indicator chosen (as
described above) and the “i” represents the households interviewed
while “j” represents the village. The list of other variables which can
affect dependent variable such as remittances, pension, stable job and
small-scale trade are captured by the vector X . The s' are the esti-
mated coefficients of the explanatory variables in the equation. The
estimate of interest is 1 which measures the effect of CSGRY on the
chosen livelihood indicators. Village specific characteristics such as
access to road, electricity, water, health facilities and so on, are re-
presented by the j. The inclusion of village specific characteristics
controls for variations in the level of socioeconomic development across
villages that may confound relationship between livelihoods and
CSGRY. The term ij represents the random error term. Conditional on
village specific characteristics and other controls (such as remittances,
pension, etc.) variations in CSGRY are plausibly exogenous and un-
correlated with the unobserved drivers of household’s livelihoods. The
outcome variables (that is, household assets, animals, crops and em-
ployment options) are binary in nature with values 1 if a household has
them and 0 otherwise. However, the number of crops grown by
household is presented as a continuous variable.
All estimations are done using ordinary least squares (OLS) in a
linear probability model (LPM) framework. The LPM approach is pre-
ferred to the non-linear estimators such as Logit/Probit for the fol-
lowing reasons. First, the LPM allows identification of impact without
necessarily having to impose a specific functional form such as logistic
or normal distribution as required by the Logit and Probit models re-
spectively (Angrist & Pischke, 2008). Second, unlike the Logit and
Probit models which require transformation of the parameters into
marginal effects to aid intuitive economic interpretations, coefficients
of the LPM model can be directly interpreted as marginal effects
(Angrist & Pischke, 2008; Bellemare, Novak, & Steinmetz, 2015).
It is however, noteworthy to emphasize that despite of the relative
advantages of LPM over Logit/Probit models, the former is not without
biases, even though these limitations are unlikely to offset the limita-
tions of the latter. A well-known limitation of the LPM is that predicted
probabilities from an LPM model can fall outside the interval, 0 to 1.
This drawback becomes important if the objective of the estimation is,
for instance to predict the probability of the outcome variable. But if the
aim of the estimation, as in the case of this paper, is to estimate the
average partial effect of CSGRY on household’s livelihoods, then this
issue is arguably unimportant (Wooldridge, 2002). To deal with the
heteroscedasticity often associated with LPM estimations, robust stan-
dard errors are used. Considering the time range between the baseline
survey and the follow-up, the structure of survey design and other
challenges aforementioned, we are careful in claiming causal effect in
the interpretation of the results.
5. Long-term livelihood effects of the child support grant
The results of the regression analysis in relation to the five in-
dicators discussed above are presented in Figs. 3–6 below. In each
figure, the estimated coefficients and 95 percent confidence interval of
the effect of CSGRY are plotted. Possible explanations of the results are
discussed, drawing on the literature and contextual data from inter-
views and observations.
As shown in Fig. 3, there is a positive correlation between all pro-
ductive assets and the CSGRY, although the correlation is statistically
significant (indicated by the 95% confidence interval above the zero
line) only for fridge, cell phone and plough. In the case of both fridge
and plough, a unit increase in CSGRY (representing one years’ worth of
CSG received for one child) could increase the probability of the
household owning these assets by 0.23 percent. In other words, a
household that has received 10 years of CSG for one child has an in-
creased likelihood of owning a plough and a fridge by 2.3%, and a cell
phone by 2.7%.
Interview and observational data suggest that these assets are
among those that women would likely prioritize. The strong correlation
for the plough is interesting in a context of longstanding trends towards
deagrarianization, especially with regards to field cultivation of staple
Fig. 2. Distribution of CSG Receipt Years (CSGRY) across households.
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crops. Hence small hand-driven ploughs were favoured and acquired by
women for vegetable production in kitchen gardens, close to home-
steads. Vehicles are expensive assets that few households have ac-
quired, and unaffordable with CSG savings, therefore the lack of cor-
relation between vehicle ownership and the CSGRY is unsurprising.
Based on interviews, a stronger correlation between CSGRY and
rainwater tanks as well as stoves than demonstrated in Fig. 3 was ex-
pected. Women are traditionally responsible for the burdensome work
of fetching water, which makes a household rainwater tank widely
coveted. Interviews reveal men tend not to prioritize rainwater tanks
(“No, we don’t care where water comes from. It’s a women’s responsi-
bility” one married man stated). Interestingly, some men did not be-
lieve it possible save up sufficient CSG money to buy a rainwater tanks
(costing about 5 times the value of a single child grant). Interviews
however revealed that woman do acquire water tanks through local
savings-and credit associations (umgalelo/stokvel). Several women pool
R 100–200 monthly, taking turns to receive the resultant lump sum.
Lindiwe5, a 50 year old woman in Manteku explained:
Fig. 3. Association between CSG receipt and selected household assets. The figure shows the coefficient plot of the regression analysis with the 95% confidence
interval shown in lines. Dependent variables are whether households own a water tank, stove, car, fridge, cellphone or plough. Each regression is controlled for
remittances, pension, stable job, small-scale trade and community specific characteristics.
Fig. 4. Association between CSGRY and household’s
ownership of pigs and poultry. The figure shows the
coefficient plot of the regression analysis with the
95% confidence interval shown in lines. Dependent
variables are whether households has pigs or
poultry. Each regression is controlled for re-
mittances, pension, stable job, petty trade and
community specific characteristics.
5 Pseudonyms are used.
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The aim of getting into umgalelo is making the money [from CSG]
bigger. You can buy stuff that is bigger than the money from the
grant alone. Umgalelo is so helpful to me because I can use that
money to buy water tank and fridge.
This demonstrates the manner in which the CSG money is controlled
by women and enables purchases that they prioritise. Informants’ ac-
counts underscored however that it is mainly those who have access to
more than two CSG per month that are able to accrue via the savings
associations. Otherwise, the R380 per month (2016) of a single CSG is
quickly exhausted through daily consumption needs, particularly if it is
the household’s sole or largest source of income.
Fig. 4 suggests that households that have received more CSGs are
statistically significantly more likely to engage in poultry production,
but that there is no significant effect for rearing pigs. The effect is even
stronger for numbers of poultry produced (though not shown in the
figure), where households that received CSG owned more poultry than
others. The data from Fig. 4, suggests that ten years’ worth of CSG re-
ceipt for one child is associated with a small increase in likelihood of
poultry ownership (4.8 percent). The interviews suggested that some
women invest the CSG in poultry production, while others purchased
Fig. 5. Association between CSGRY and
household maize and other crop production,
as well as crop diversity. The figure shows
the coefficient plot of the regression analysis
with the 95% confidence interval shown in
lines. Dependent variables are whether
households grow maize or other crops, and
the number of crops grown for the crop di-
versity plot. Each regression is controlled for
remittances, pension, stable job, petty trade
and community specific characteristics.
Fig. 6. Association between CSGRY and household engagement in small-scale trade and other informal economic activities, or holding a stable job. The figure shows
the coefficient plot of the regression analysis with the 95% confidence interval shown in lines. Dependent variables are whether household members are engaged in
petty trade or hold a stable job. Each regression is controlled for remittances, pension, stable job, petty trade and community specific characteristics.
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pigs and piglets. CSG receipt and agricultural production decisions are
shaped by gender norms. For example, women eschew investing in
cattle, with some even relegating other large livestock to men. A mar-
ried woman stated: “the husband must be responsible for paying things
like goats and cattle”.
In terms of crop production, there is a statistically significant posi-
tive correlation between CSGRY and growing maize as well as other
crops, as shown in Fig. 5. There is a similarly, statistically significant
positive relationship between CSGRY and household’s crop diversity.
Ten years of receiving a single CSG elevates the probability of maize
cultivation by 4.6%, and other crops by 3.9%. In terms of crop diversity,
ten unit’s increase in CSGRY raise crop diversity by 0.36. Given the
average crop diversity of about three crops per household in the sample,
the likelihood of growing more than three crops increases about 12%
for every 10 years of receiving a CSG.
The correlation between CSGRY and crop diversity is contextualised
by interviews and observations, where informants explained the CSG
resented an opportunity to diversify incomes through growing a larger
variety of crops for sale (e.g. spinach and taro). One research assistant
remarked: “A few people plant like serious planting, like the whole
garden will be spinach and cabbage… and they sell to us [other villa-
gers]”, even if but underscored that these were just a few households.
When discussing why more villages did not take advantage of the op-
portunity to cultivate and sell vegetables, the discussion often turned to
the litany of other constraints on farming. As a Sizwe, a man in his 40’s
explains:
The soil here is bad, sandy and salty, it needs fertilizer and it ends up
being expensive. We [then] do feel like it’s better to buy then to
plant. I used to plant some veggies here but for two years I didn’t get
anything. Other problems like too wet soil, expensive fencing and
moles that destroy everything. I had a spinach and it was big, but the
moles went underneath it and [shows with hands how the spinach
wilted]…
Other problems include wild animals such as bushpigs
(Potamochoerus larvatus) and monkeys, or untended livestock damaging
fields and gardens. The sub-tropical weather is unpredictable with dry
spells and excessive rains leading to waterlogging. Thus, the CSG can
represent an opportunity to earn income from cultivation, but mainly to
those who have gardens, with good soil, favourable location and in-
frastructure.
In Fig. 6 the results for indicators 4 and 5 are shown, and the data
reveals a positive relationship between holding a stable job or engaging
in petty trade and CSGRY, but this result is not statistically significant
for either of the variables. In interviews, informants insisted that CSG
income neither helps nor inhibits job-searching efforts, but rather the
main problem was the dearth of work opportunities.
Sizwe in Cutwini explained that if job opportunities existed they
would surely find the resources to apply for the jobs:
There is always money to go and look for work… but most people
know that if you go there [to town/further afield], you will not just
find it. [….] There is no point going there… spending your money
on travels and then find out that there are no jobs… and then you
have to come back…
Though many CSG recipients may hope to undertake petty trade or
other small-scale informal economic activities with capital derived from
the grant, few succeed, as indicated by the lack of a significant corre-
lation. Interviews, and an example, shed light on some of the difficulties
involved.
In the case of Nolwethu, she managed to save R1000 from her CSG
after several months, and sought to buy used clothes in Durban and
resell them in the village. She ran into various problems, and ended up
with a net loss. She explained:
… from that thousand rand is from here to Lusikisiki [closest town],
the return [fare] is R30. Then from Lusiki to Durban is two-hundred
[rand] to return. Then– so the remaining [money] is for the stocking
[up on clothes to resell]. So it's not easy to calculate, because maybe
you can take something for your lunch there, so you didn't know
how much maybe you can spend for lunch. Then when you're back
you can sell these clothes… [but] I didn't get even the amount of
thousand rand. […] also because of this one taking for the credit
[i.e. a person saying they will pay later]. Some others ran away with
this money [i.e. never paid], so…
The example above illustrates the difficulty marking profit from a
small sum of capital, in a resource poor environment. Nolwethu had not
visited to Durban previously, did not expect lunch to be so expensive,
and with only about R700 left (after travel and meals) to spend on
stocking so she could not negotiate a good bulk purchase. She thought it
unlikely to be able to add more than a 50% margin to her stock, when
selling in the village. Calculating together with her, during the inter-
view, revealed that even if she had managed to sell everything, her
profit would amount to a total of R50 for the entire venture - to her
astonishment. There was the additional problem of customers buying
on credit and defaulting. This example illustrates several challenges
facing informal enterprises, namely, small starting capital and scale, the
comparatively high transaction costs to procure stock, a lack of contacts
and trading experience, the lack of purchasing power in the village and
difficulties collecting debt. Against this backdrop, the poor correlation
between petty trade and CSG does not seem particularly surprising.
6. Discussion
Firstly, it ought to be emphasized that while this paper only looked
at potential long-term effects on impoverished livelihoods, cash trans-
fers have other important documented effects, such as rapid effects on
poverty reduction, including improving food security and school en-
rolment (DSD et al., 2012; Eyal, Woolard, & Burns, 2014; The Use and
Effectiveness of Social Grants in South Africa; Zembe-Mkabile,
Surender, Sanders, Jackson, & Doherty, 2015) as well as various social
and relational effects such as reduction of risky sexual behaviour of
adolescents (Cluver et al., 2013), increasing recipient women’s dignity
(Wright, Neves, Ntshongwana, & Noble, 2015) and feelings of au-
tonomy, independence and power over decision-making for caregiver
recipients (Granlund & Hochfeld, 2020; Hochfeld & Plagerson, 2017). It
should be stressed that the intended purpose of the CSG is for children’s
material needs, making the productive outcomes all the more remark-
able. In addition, even if effects of the CSG are not large in narrowly
material terms, they can cause micro-level transformations in social and
relational dynamics – e.g. through effects on gender relations by ex-
panding women’s autonomy, choices, dignity and social recognition,
something which some of us explore in a different publication from this
project (Hochfeld & Plagerson, 2017).
The regression analysis suggests that households that received cu-
mulatively more CSG income (higher number of CSGRY) are better-off
in some ways (but not in other ways), relative to households that re-
ceived less or no CSG income. There was a statistically significant po-
sitive correlation between receiving more CSG income and owning
productive assets, especially fridges, cellular phones and ploughs, as
well as for the rearing of poultry and growing of crops. Interviews
confirm that women do buy these items using CSG income accumulated
in local savings groups, indeed the interviews further suggest the pur-
chase of water tanks and stoves, although the latter were not statisti-
cally significant. The regression analysis also suggests an interesting
statistically significant correlation between CSGRY and crop diversity,
which interviews have also confirmed for some households
However, the analysis showed no significant correlation between
CSG receipt and holding stable jobs or engaging in small-scale informal
trade, despite such correlations suggested by earlier studies (such as the
correlation between receiving social grants and a higher success rate in
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finding employment found by Samson et al. in 2004). In interviews,
informants resolutely explained that if a job opportunity presented it-
self people would apply, regardless of their access to grant income. In a
situation of more available jobs, access to CSG income to go and apply
for them all could potentially have more impact. Even if grant money
can be used to try to engage in small-scale business ventures, these are
seldom sustainable over the long term, and thus unlikely to appear in
the 2016 survey. Therefore, while the CSG has positive material effects,
including productive effects that are important for recipients, the re-
sults do not indicate that recipients’ households have significantly
transformed their circumstances or livelihoods over the long term, to be
able to secure more sustainable livelihoods and move out of poverty.
The interviews also identified that it is primarily women with access
to more than two grants for an extended period of time, or who have
access to other incomes, who are best able to leverage CSG income into
productive assets and activities. Conversely, the example of Nolwethu’s
failed petty clothes reselling illustrates the constraints on leveraging a
very small sum into successful long-term livelihood outcomes. This is
consistent with research from elsewhere in rural Africa (Fisher,
Pozarny, & Estruch, 2017; (Hajdu, Ansell, Robson, van Blerk, & Chipeta,
2011). Small sums of cash are neither sufficient for impoverished re-
cipients to overcome the real binding constraints on engaging in re-
munerative and livelihood-enhancing activities, nor transcending the
legacy of structural under-development, persistent poverty and racia-
lized inequality (Devereux, 2007; Sabates-Wheeler & Devereux, 2008).
Despite evidence and reports of recipients directing grant income to-
wards generating new livelihood activities or looking for work, the
effects of these efforts remain modest.
Explanations for the seemingly positive, albeit constrained, impacts
of grant receipt on livelihood assets and activities, require an atten-
tiveness to larger structural factors. South Africa presents a particular
context, with comparatively few opportunities to leverage small sums
into larger gains, or (in agrarian political economy terms) ‘accumula-
tion from below’ (Bernstein, 2010). Employment prospects in the
formal labour market are inhibited by the long, capital intensive growth
trajectory of the South African economy (Black & Gerwel, 2014), and
the structure of the economy crowds out the space for emergent or
small-scale enterprises (Philip, 2010). Even subsistence agriculture, and
the self-provisioning of food, commonplace in much of Africa and a
fundamental sector for many developmental interventions, is notable
for its paucity in South Africa. Not only does a long legacy of state
underinvestment and poor infrastructure undercut the prospects for
small-scale agriculture in the former homelands, corporate super-
markets efficiently distribute cheap food, imported or domestically
produced by large-scale agribusinesses (Greenberg, 2015). These in-
terlocking structural factors, ultimately limit the economic options
open to impoverished social grant recipient households.
What does this study reveal about the potential of cash transfers to
deliver long-term effects on livelihoods amidst increasing attention to
cash transfers as a development intervention in rural areas? Although
small amounts of regular cash transfers do have consumption effects, is
there also potential for more transformative developmental effects?
While the study suggests that the CSG had some positive long-term li-
velihood effects for many rural households, it cannot show that cash
transfers would offer a pathway out of poverty and towards sustainable
livelihoods for these households. Indeed, the interviews illustrate the
difficulties in creating long-term, sustainable enterprises or acquiring
employment in a context of deep poverty. It is therefore crucial that the
results suggesting positive effects of CSG on livelihoods are not over-
interpreted to claim that cash transfers alone are able to move re-
cipients out of poverty.
Cash transfers need to be coupled with other complementary public
policy interventions in order to create a comprehensive web of social
security, structural change and economic opportunities in order to
support the poor and vulnerable in building sustainable long-term rural
livelihoods. Hence there is no easy answer to the question framing this
paper – as cash transfers can contribute to more sustainable rural li-
velihoods, but remain contingent and dependent on other public policy
interventions and structural change. Following the initial wave of lit-
erature drawing attention to the potentials of cash transfers, more re-
cent literature increasingly points to limits in what can be achieved (de
Haan, 2014; Devereux & McGregor, 2014; Daidone et al., 2019). The
present study reinforces the need for caution in believing that cash
transfers provide a sufficient solution to rural poverty, when major
structural constraints continue to prevail.
Finally, even if the money spent on development projects versus
social grants are not directly comparable, it is pertinent to consider the
resources spent on the various (costly) failed development projects in
the focal villages over the years. In contrast to these development in-
terventions, CSG transfers have at least aided recipient households in
securing their basic needs, and in several cases made contributions
towards productive assets and activities, thus improving livelihoods in
the long term. Viewed holistically and in these terms, social grant
transfers have arguably had greater impact than any other development
intervention in the focal villages. They indubitably are an important
part of a package of fundamental interventions that are necessary to
strengthen impoverished livelihoods over time.
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